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Abstract 
Social sciences start by looking at the social-psychological attributes of humans to model and 
explain their observed behavior. However, we suggest starting the study of observed human 
behavior with the universal laws of physics, e.g., the principle of minimum action.  In our 
proposed three-tier framework, behavior is a manifestation of action driven by physical, 
biological, and social-psychological principles at the core, intermediate, and top tier, 
respectively. More broadly, this reordering is an initial step towards building a platform for 
reorganizing the research methods used for theorizing and modeling behavior. This 
perspective outlines and illustrates how a physical law can account for observed human 
behavior and sketches the elements of a broader agenda. 
JEL Classification: B30, B40, D01 
Keywords: Human behavior, physics, biology, social sciences 
Introduction 
In the history of thought, animal action has been intertwined with some form of intent, 
purpose, teleology, or goal, whether deliberate, habitual, or hardwired. Decision theory, at 
least since von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 1 axiomatization of “reasonable behavior” 2, 
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was built on the shared assumption of intentionality in game theory-3 and operations 
research. These logic-based formulations of “reasonable behavior,” though subject to 
criticism by philosophers 4, economists 5,6, and other scholars 7,8,9, claim a considerable 
command in the study of human behavior with variations in methodology, but a general 
consensus on fundamentals. Engineers have paid close and continuing attention to 
optimizing schemes in biological systems 10, as well as embedding robots with various forms 
of consciousness 11. Cognitive scientists have explored the architecture of the mind, while 
questioning how mental and physical existence get combined 12,13, and also studied the 
nature of inquiry that precedes action 14. However, modeling and understanding human 
behavior independently of reason and intention is not without precedent. For example, 
markets populated by simple “zero-intelligence” (ZI) agents stripped of all cognition can yield 
aggregate level outcomes that capture important aspects of markets, in particular allocative 
efficiency 15. The work on movement of pedestrian crowds modeled as a physical 
phenomenon 16,17 and the use of the free-energy principle for constructing a unified brain 
theory  18,19 are other examples of such work. Here, we are not offering a reductionist 
account, nor a normative one. In its first order of approximation, our approach seeks an 
understanding of observed behavior with the help of physical laws before resorting to 
biology or higher human faculties.  
 
Certain similarities among the three examples illustrated in Figure 1 lead us to entertain the 
possibility that granting priority to intent may not necessarily be the best way to understand 
at least some aspects of human behavior, even when it appears to be conscious and 
controlled. Consider (1) a lifeguard rushing across a sandy beach and swimming through 
water to rescue a drowning child; (2) ants making their way from their hill to a food source 
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(sugar), traversing both smooth and coarse surfaces before returning home; and (3) photons 
traveling from the sun through space and water to enter the eye of a fish swimming 
underwater. All three could follow a straight line or minimum distance path 20,21. Instead, 
they follow a kinked path that obeys Fermat’s Principle that the travel time to reach the end 
point is minimized (also stated as Snell-Descartes’ law equating the ratio of sines of the 
angles of incidence at the kink to the ratio of velocities in the two media—sand and water, 
smooth and rough surfaces, and empty space and water, respectively, in the three 
examples).  
 
Figure 1: Lifeguard, Ants, and Sunbeam: All Follow a Kinked Path across Two Media 
   
 
Do the apparent similarities among the paths that humans, ants, and photons take, 
illustrated in the three panels of Figure 1 follow some fundamental principle common to the 
three examples? Or is it simply a case of the same mathematical model that happens to 
capture diverse and unrelated phenomena in different domains? Viewed in terms of 
cognitive abilities alone, purpose, intent, motivation, learning, and free will are easily 
attributed to the lifeguard. With effort, some of these might also be stretched to fit the 
behavior of ants. However, it strains credulity to associate these attributes with photons or 
electromagnetic radiation. At a biological level, the behavior of the lifeguard and the ants 
can be understood as conforming to energy conservation, which is most often in an 
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organism’s survival interest. But can we systematize these empirically observed phenomena 
within the structure of a physical law across these three very different but commonplace 
(non-exotic) contexts? Our proposal, as outlined in the following section, aims to do just 
that. In this instance, we suggest using the principle of least action. As our framework 
expands, other laws of physics could be more suitable candidates to serve as organizing 
principles for observed behavior.  
 
 
The principle of least action and the physics of human behavior 
 
In classical mechanics, the path of least action is the path along which the sum (integral) of 
the difference between the kinetic energy and potential energy, at every point in time, is 
minimized 22. We propose using this principle to isolate the elements of human action that 
arise based on our physical existence from elements attributable to biology and the higher 
faculties.  
 
Proposition: Of all possible paths from a beginning point A to an end 
point B, the materially efficient path uses minimal action, where action 
is a scalar that corresponds to the dimension in which value has been 
conserved.  
 
What remains is to specify the particular value conserved in the context of observed 
behavior. Thereafter, to the extent that the path followed by humans coincides with the 
path of least action, physical laws suffice for understanding it.  Note that we do not propose 
 5 
the physically efficient path as a normative standard and consequently do not advocate 
approaching it to “improve” behavior.  Instead, to the extent that the observed path 
deviates from this physically efficient path, an explanation for such deviations will be sought 
in biology and social-psychological attributes associated with the biological endowments of 
animals as well as in higher faculties of humans. These higher tiers of the proposed structure 
call for an alternative, nonphysical apparatus. Thus positioned, our approach avoids the 
controversy over the suitability of mechanically driven benchmarks for the study of human 
behavior. Our three-tier framework can be visualized as a sphere with a physical core and a 
biological middle layer, wrapped in a social-psychological cover. A first step in constructing 
this framework is summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 shows six possibilities of a path of least action between a beginning point A and an 
end point B. In each case (a numbered row in Table 1), a path in a specified space is 
generated by minimizing action with respect to the “action element” indicated in column 3. 
In each case, elements exogenous to action are listed under column 2. Moving down the 
table from rows 1 to 6, the complexity increases and the space has more dimensions or 
properties. Nonetheless, the action is defined in the physical sense, even when higher-tier 
attributes are involved. Our main contribution is the very specification of an action element 
that is configured on the physical level. Deliberately confining ourselves to the laws of 
physics, we examine at this tier (the physical core) the extent to which behavior can be 
captured and characterized. We remain cognizant that nonphysical understanding is called 
for when examining nonphysical aspects of behavior. Examples of nonphysical aspects are 
natural selection 23 and survival of the fittest 24,25 in biological or social evolution 26,27,28, 
deliberate processes such as mathematical/logical or algorithmic ones 29, and partially or 
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fully subconscious processes such as heuristic and intuitive decisions 30. Thus, the modeling 
strategy of starting from the physical tier permits as many physical laws as possible to be 
attributed to this core tier, without seeking help from the outer biological and social-
psychological tiers at this stage.  
 
Table 1: Extending the principle of least action to account for behavior 
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A broad range of actions is illustrated in the six rows of Table 1 using physical properties 
only. Row 1 configures the simplest case of physically moving from point A to point B, where 
both are exogenously given on a plane, the action element is Euclidean distance, and the 
resulting path is a straight line on the plane, which minimizes the distance.  
 
Row 2 presents a familiar path of minimum action that a ball thrown in the air takes in the 
force field of gravity to return to the ground. Row 3 provides a decomposition of the 
phenomena in Figure 1, captured in Snell-Descartes law, as an application of the general 
principle of least action. Here, the action element that is minimized is time instead of 
distance, the fourth dimension in Minkowski space31.  
 
Row 4 implements the idea of using physics to explain behavior. The action element here is 
not a new dimension but a physical attribute, the (change in the) angle of gaze. The 
exogenous element here is time, and execution of action does not require the actor’s 
preliminary knowledge of the specific endpoint. Although a biological construct is likely at 
work 32—referred to in the literature as the gaze heuristic 33—under the action element in 
Column 3, our proposed configuration requires only the fixed angle of gaze. Keeping the 
changes to a minimum (ideally zero) is based not on the evolutionary capacity of maintaining 
the gaze (that resides in the biological brain) but on a physical element. Thus, this 
configuration remains in the physical tier.  
 
Row 5 takes a biological phenomenon — connections among the ganglia of the neural 
system in a tiny worm (nematode) — that minimizes the total length of wiring. This 
configuration assumes fixed ganglia locations for which connecting paths have been 
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optimized, and thus does not include the possibility that the location of ganglia and 
connections are co-determined 34. With this caveat, external elements are specified along 
with an efficient path (network of connections) resulting from a minimization of action as 
measured by the length of connections. 
 
The last row in Table 1 (Row 6) presents problem-solving behavior viewed as an act of 
moving from the problematic beginning to a resolved end. This signifies the use of a very 
simple heuristic, one-reason decision-making, for solving the problem at hand 35,36. The 
external requirements or non-action elements are specific structures in the task 
environment that lend themselves to such solutions. Here, economizing an action element 
does not involve the cognitive effort spent on the search for relevant cues and the 
subsequent choice of only one cue/reason from the set of all available cues. Our formulation 
seeks to capture the action only after one cue is chosen. In this case, the efficiency (and 
simplicity) of the action arises from considering and acting upon one cue only, instead of 
taking the effort to weigh and add many cues. The path in this case is an abstract 
interpretation, a mathematical series that corresponds to the non-compensatory structure 
of the cues’ environment. The caveat concerning the unknown amount of effort required for 
judging which cue applies in a certain situation also applies to this formulation 37. Populating 
this table — i.e., representing observed behavior in terms of an action element, exogenous 
factors, and a path — generates physical configurations of observed behaviors in terms of 
the principle of least action. As we move forward with our broader agenda, it is plausible to 
expect that other physical laws will gradually enter the stage.  
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What we have discussed so far is only a part of one branch of a larger conceptual framework 
for organizing methods of studying human behavior or action.  In this framework, a theory 
and its methods constitute a lens through which the subject matter is explored. A major 
difference between physical science and human science is that the investigator always 
remains an outsider to the subject matter in the former 38, whereas in the study of human 
behavior, the investigator simultaneously constitutes part of the subject matter. Interesting 
results arise from this overlap between the actor and the investigator. In particular, the 
actor can hold different views of behavioral phenomena from the investigator’s views as we 
shall see later. The next section sketches one lens of the broader platform that our agenda 
aims to construct. 
 
Lens 1: Action characterized as movement 
All human behavior comprises actions. Viewing an action as a movement between two 
points, we define it as follows: 
 
Definition: An action is a movement from state A to state B, 
where A and B can be specifiable (denoted as ?̇?𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐵𝐵)̇ or 
nonspecifiable (denoted as ?̃?𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐵𝐵�) states. A pair of 
beginning-end states (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵) is a situation. 
 
An actor looking at an action (emic view) through Lens 1 faces one of four possible 
situations, labeled S1 to S4 in the following descriptions: 
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S1: ?̇?𝐴  → ?̇?𝐵 – Physical laws are directly applicable. All cases outlined in Table 1 fall in 
this situation. The observable outcome is binary in that the actor either succeeds or 
fails to arrive at ?̇?𝐵. 
S2: ?̃?𝐴  →   ?̇?𝐵 – Wishes, ambitions, and dreams exemplify this situation. No action is 
taken, but the end is imagined or anticipated. Once the action is taken to achieve 
them, S2 collapses into S1. 
S3: ?̇?𝐴  → 𝐵𝐵�  – Examples are job offers or marriage proposals for which an action is 
initiated but outcomes are uncertain. Judgment and decisions occur by using 
specifiable proxies for the possible endings.  
S4: ?̇?𝐴 = ?̇?𝐵 �𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ?̃?𝐴 = 𝐵𝐵�� – Inaction or null action. It can be deliberate or not, 
corresponding to conscious and subconscious cases of inaction, respectively. This 
differentiation might be of use to those policymakers who want to tap into defaults.  
 
Note that a modeler (etic view) specifies beginnings and ends, and therefore formally deals 
with S1 only. Our argument is that S1 modeling will be more effective when modelers 
initially confine their focus to the physical laws. Giving cognition and social-psychological 
attributes of humans the top priority limits the scope for physical formalization. We do not 
suggest abandoning the existing methods; rather, we present a platform of unifying lenses 
that offers, for potentially every method of studying human behavior, a shared basis for 




The big picture 
 
The general conceptualization of “movement” in Lens 1 creates a worldview useful for 
describing and understanding human behavior. Table 2 lists two more lenses that generate 
other worldviews and insights: Lens 2 (labelled “match”) and Lens 3 (labelled 
“construction”). The labels correspond to the focal principle of investigation that figuratively 
constitutes the respective lens. As alluded to in the preceding section, two non-identical 
strands of questions arise from the perspectives of actors versus modelers. A lens can be 
used by both actors and modelers. In previous sections, taking the role of a modeler, we first 
formulate six specific items by focusing on the physical characteristics of the action 
configured by Lens 1 (Table 1). Then, we view the action through Lens 1 from the 
perspective of an actor to extract meaningful combinations of beginnings and ends with 
respect to specifiability. This work continues by exploring the subject matter through 
different lenses, each affording the modeler different working tools. So far, we have 
conceptualized three lenses, which are listed in Table 2 along with their related concepts 




Table 2: Organizing methods of modeling human behavior through different lenses. 
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starting point of the 
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Related concepts Binary outcomes 
(success or failure) 
result from 
following rules. 
Success results from 
an accurate match of 
m and e. 
 
Perceptions (of e) 





by optimizing a 
quantifiable metric, 
such as Max Utility 
or Min Cost. 
Discipline of 
modeler 




These are the steps we have taken so far.  First, we chose a law of physics, the principle of 
least action, to develop a proposition and definition that constitute a physics-based platform 
for decomposing observed phenomenon. Table 1 depicts the current effort to extend this 
development, which falls under Lens 1 in the broader platform. Some attempts exist in 
cognitive science to derive particular cognitive models from perception 39 and other 
universals 40,41, or to reconcile physics-based principles used in cognitive models 42. Our plan 
is more general; it reverses the order of the study of human behavior by starting from the 
physical core rather than from cognition and other human faculties. The plan is to 
identify/develop connections between different lenses that enable them to communicate 
with one another by analogy. For example, consider intuition and deliberation, which are 
viewed as two cognitive capacities in Lens 2. One possible analogy to Lens 1 is: if intuition is 
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one cognitive medium and deliberation is another, then arriving at a decision using both is 
like the lifeguard running across a sandy beach (analogous to rapid intuitive engagement 
first) and then swimming in the water (deliberating next, at a slower speed). Each “medium” 
affords a different speed analogous to the cognitive effort needed for intuition and for 
deliberation; and the efficiency of behavior arises from taking the longer distance (using 
more of one cognitive capacity) at a higher speed (where the cognitive medium operates 
with more ease.)  That is, humans switching between intuition and deliberation tend to “stay 
longer in the faster medium”. The benefit of generating these mappings is the creation of a 
tractable platform for interdisciplinary exchange and collaboration.   
 
Discussion and remarks 
 
At the outset, we sought to understand the reason for and meaning of behaviors taken from 
three different examples. The human lifeguard, the ants, and the inanimate photons—all 
tend to follow the same law of refraction (Snell-Descartes law, or its precedents in earlier 
forms by several scientists, including Ptolemy and Ibn Sahl43), albeit with different degrees of 
precision. The precision of correspondence to this law is greatest in the physical domain and 
diminishes for ants and humans. Optimization in the form of principle of least action is a 
fundamental organizing principle of the universe. There is no reason to think that the matter 
and energy that acquire biological properties (ants) or even higher faculties (humans) cease 
to be subject to the universal laws of physics. Given that economizing on action is a 
fundamental property of the universe, ants and lifeguards do not need their cognitive 
endowments for this purpose any more than the photons that do so without any such 
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endowments. For this reason, we propose a perspective on observations from all domains 
that share this common core. 
 
Biology endows the animate world with attributes, tendencies, cognitive faculties, and even 
intentions, purposes, and teleologies absent in the inanimate world. We humans are 
especially proud of our exceptional capabilities in this regard and count ourselves as 
standing apart from all other species at the top of the pyramid. Irrespective of whether we 
count ourselves as part of the animal world, the additions of biological, social, and 
psychological endowments bring additional elements to observed behavior absent in the 
core physical tier. It is no surprise then that photons follow Snell–Descartes’ law quite 
precisely, but that for ants and lifeguards the law provides only a central tendency or basin 
of attraction.  
 
In summary, physical laws can explain only a part of observational variation in biological and 
social-psychological tiers. To explain the remainder arising from this greater complexity, we 
need to account for biological principles (e.g., in the case of ants) and for biological, social, 
cultural, and psychological aspects (e.g., in the case of the lifeguard). At the same time, the 
order proposed in this perspective reverses the conventional approach of seeking 
explanations for human behavior in sociocultural and psychological elements before 
resorting to biology and almost never dipping into the physical laws at the core. This 
proposed order generates a platform for extensive consideration of existing, well-configured 
physical laws at the level at which they apply and implies disengagement from them at the 
outer tiers.  
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Based on a minimal definition of action as movement, we propose a framework for a 
stepwise study of human behavior that begins with the physical aspects of observed 
behavior, then expands to biological, and thereafter to social, cultural, and psychological 
attributes in search of explaining the remaining behavioral variations. A corollary to our 
definition is that the transition from physics to biology (and from biology to social and 
psychological exploration) calls for alternative, domain-specific, nonphysical formalizations. 
This perspective sketches out an initial blueprint for pursuing an agenda of considering 
actions in various domains/tiers in an overarching conceptual platform. It is our hope that 
this approach will produce a fruitful structure for stimulating interdisciplinary discussion of 
the existing methods of investigating behavior and generating new methods. From a 
methodological angle, our platform generates investigation potential akin to what reverse 
Bayesian analysis brought to Bayesian analysis 44,45,46.    
 
We emphasize that ours is not a reductionist proposal to claim that everything can be 
explained by physics or by anything else. Rather, we suggest that physical laws deserve the 
first chance to explain observations from animate and inanimate worlds because matter and 
energy included in biological domains do not lose their physicality by virtue of the added 
DNA, brain, higher faculties, and society in which individuals grow up and live. The benefit of 
starting at the physical core and remaining within the borders of this first tier is to eliminate 
the necessity for modelers who inevitably use physical forms to justify the relevance of this 
work to human behavior.  
This perspective is not intended as a guideline for others to follow. Instead, we attempt to 
consider new approaches to thinking, investigating and categorizing the study of human 
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behavior. Our hope is to elicit feedback, suggestions, and criticism that will further this 
objective.   
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